收入共享契约下价格歧视及配置效率分析

Price discrimination and allocation efficiency with revenue-sharing contracts

与供应链管理中研究收入共享契约如何实现供应链协调不同,主要研究其实现供应链协调时对上游供应商的定价行为、配置效率和社会福利的影响.研究发现:在收入共享契约协调的供应链内,上游供应商对效率不同的下游厂商实施歧视定价,其与下游厂商生产效率、产品替代性一起影响着配置效率和社会福利,虽然收入共享契约通过实现供应链协调能够增加各厂商的总利润,但对消费者剩余的影响取决于多种因素,具有不确定性,因此对于社会总福利的影响也具有不确定性.还进一步讨论了供应链厂商之间的讨价还价能力对收入共享契约分配系数的影响,识别出影响收入共享分配系数的一些重要因素.根据分析结果认为:收入共享契约作为纵向约束协议,对其进行反垄断审查应该适用"合理推定原则"而不是"本身违法原则"

Different from literatures in supply chain management which focuses on the role of revenue-sharing contract in coordinating supply chains, this paper mainly studies the effect of such contracts on upstream suppliers＇ pricing decisions, allocation efficiency and social welfare. Results show that： in supply chains coordinated by a revenue-sharing contract, an upstream supplier imposes discriminatory pricing to downstream heterogeneous manufactures, which, along with downstream efficiency and product substitution, affects the allocation efficiency and social welfare. Though revenue-sharing can increase joint profits through coordination, the effect on consumer surplus and social welfare is ambiguous. This paper also discusses the effect of firms＇ relative bargaining power on the revenue-sharing proportion, and identifies factors affecting the revenue-sharing parameter. Finally, based on the analyzed results, it is suggested that, as a means of vertical restraint, the anti-trust examination on revenue-sharing should adopt the ＂rule of reason＂ rather than ＂per se illegal＂.