“共生”关系下的控制权防御机制设计——以“万科与宝能系之争”为例

Theoretical mechanism of control rights defenses under symbiotic relationship:A case study of control rights fight between Vanke and Baoneng

搭建了公司控制权防御机制设计的理论框架,并以万科抵御宝能敌意收购事件为例对理论框架进行了验证.研究结果表明:1)在"共生"关系下,公司特质和收购路径特征分别决定了事前(预防型)和事中(主动型)控制权防御机制的设计; 2)为了缓解控制权防御机制过度保护管理层的现象,设计维系"共生"关系的制衡机制必不可少; 3)控制权防御机制设计受制度环境的制约,并随着制度环境、公司特质和收购路径的变化动态演进.突破了既有的公司控制权防御机制研究的分析框架,能为我国上市公司设计控制权防御机制提供一定的参考价值.

A theoretical framework of the control rights defense mechanism is set up firstly,and then the model is verified with the case of Vanke's control rights defense to Baoneng. Conclusions indicate the followings:( 1) Based on symbiosis hypothesis,the design of control rights defense mechanism in advance( preventive)and in progress( active) are separately determined by Firm-specific and M&A's path characteristics.( 2) To prevent the control rights defenses protect managers excessively,it is necessary to set a balance mechanism to maintain a symbiotic relationship.( 3) The design of control rights defense mechanism is also influenced by the institutional environment,and needs to be improved along with changes of firm-specific characteristics,institutional environment and M&A's path characteristics. This paper makes a breakthrough in the existing company control rights defenses frameworks and offers some references to the design of control rights defenses mechanism for China's listed companies.