黑格尔伦理国家观的矛盾及其解决——个人在何种意义上能成为国家的创建者

The Contradiction in Hegel’s notion of state and its Resolution——In Which Sense Can Individual Become the Founder of State?

自《法哲学原理》出版以来,以海姆为代表的批判者就认为,黑格尔关于国家的两条原则,即实体性原则与自我意识原则之间存在着根本性矛盾,结果导致他在事实上抛弃了自我意识立场,倒退到了古代的整体主义。尽管现代西方出现了许多为黑格尔国家学作自由主义辩护的著述,但这一难题依然未得到实质性解决。本文试图从《精神现象学》中的＂实体与自我意识的同一性＂原理出发来解决这一难题,即通过以主观性为中介对普遍意志和个别意志之间的关系的重构,来证明黑格尔的实体性原则包含着自我意识原则,其国家观仍建立在自我意识的基础之上,从而为黑格尔伦理国家观的矛盾的解决提供一条新思路。

Since the publication of Elements of the Philosophy of Right,it has been criticized by Rudolf Haym,etc. due to the fundamental contradiction between Hegel＇s principles of state,i.e. the principle of substantiality and the principle of self-consciousness,which compels Hegel to abandon the standpoint of self-consciousness and fall back to ancient holism. Notwithstanding recent studies that plead for Hegel＇s philosophy of state from the liberalist perspective,this conundrum remains unsolved. Preceding form the principle of the ＂unity of the substance with self-consciousness＂in Phenomenology of Spirit,the author seeks to reconstruct the relationship between universal and individual will through the mediation of subjectivity. The aim of this approach is to justify that the principle of substantiality entails the principle of self-consciousness and that Hegel＇s notion of state is still grounded on self-consciousness and therefore to provide a brand-new solution to the contradiction in Hegel＇s notion of state.