政府干预,内部控制与公司未决诉讼

Government Intervention, Internal Control and Pending Litigation of Listed Companies

本文以我国2008-2013年沪深两市非金融类上市公司为样本,实证研究内部控制对企业未决诉讼的作用方式,并将政府干预的影响纳入本文进行了深入分析。研究结果发现:高质量的内部控制能够显著降低上市公司发生未决诉讼的可能性,同时降低未决诉讼的涉诉频率和涉诉金额;将政府干预因素纳入本文,发现政府干预削弱了内部控制对未决诉讼的抑制作用;进一步研究发现,内部控制对公司诉讼的抑制作用在"提起诉讼"与"被诉讼"两个方面都有作用,但对危害更大的被告诉讼案件的作用更为明显。本文丰富了内部控制发挥公司内部治理和风险控制作用的情景素材,也为现实中政府进一步推行市场化、减少干预提供经验佐证。

Based on the Chinese listed companies during 2008-2013, this paper examines the impact of the internal control on the listed companies＇ litigation risk. The findings of our study are as follows. First, firms which have effective internal control enjoy a reduction in the risk of pending litigation. To be specific,, the effective internal control reduces the frequency of pending litigation and the amount of money involved. Second, the government intervention weakens the lowering effect of internal control on the pending litigation. From this research, we better understand the internal governance role of the companies＇ internal control.