线性数量折扣下零售商合作的联盟稳定性研究

Cost Allocation and Coalition Stability for Collaborative Procurement with Linear Quantity Discount

在激烈的市场竞争中,通过降低原材料的采购成本来降低生产成本成为中小企业增加利润率水平和提高市场竞争力的重要手段之一.因此,越来越多的中小企业通过组成正式或非正式的联盟进行联合采购来降低采购价格.文章考虑了供应商提供线性数量折扣方案下多零售商联合采购的订货决策与费用分配问题.应用合作博弈理论,将数量折扣下多零售商联合采购的费用分配问题构造成联合采购博弈,证明了博弈满足次加性和平衡性,给出了一种属于博弈核心的费用分配方案,并用最大一致集分析了联盟的稳定性.

In the fierce market competition, reducing production costs through reducing the procurement cost has become one of the important ways for small and medium enterprises（SMEs） to increase the level of profit margins and improve market competitiveness. Hence, more and more SMEs have formed formal or informal coalitions to obtain a low purchase price. This paper studies the ordering decision and cost allocation of collaborative procurement among multiple retailers under the supplier＇s linear quantity discount. Applying the cooperative game theory, the cost allocation problem of collaborative procurement under the quantity discount is established as a cooperative game. It is proved that the game satisfies subadditivity and balancedness, and a cost allocation scheme belonging to the core of the game is proposed. Moreover, the stability of the coalition is analysed using the concept of the largest consistent set.