我国无居民海岛PPP项目风险分担的博弈模型

Game Model of Risk Sharing for PPP Projects on Non-resident Islands in China

对无居民海岛进行科学合理的开发和利用是我国建设海洋强国的重要环节,为了保证我国无居民海岛PPP项目开发的顺利进行,公平合理的风险分担机制是至关重要的。基于地位非对称不完全信息条件下的讨价还价博弈模型,提出了我国无居民海岛PPP项目开发过程中政府部门和私营部门风险分担比例的确定方法,并用实例对模型进行了验证。通过对模型的分析发现,政府部门和私营部门的风险分担比例与双方地位的非对称性以及谈判损耗系数有关,谈判过程中需要引起双方的重视。研究成果为公平合理地进行风险分担提供了一定的理论依据,同时对推进我国无居民海岛PPP项目的开发具有一定的指导意义。

The scientific and rational exploitation of the non-resident islands is an important strategy for China to build maritime power. To ensure the successful development of PPP projects on non-resident island in China, a fair and reasonable risk sharing mechanism is crucial. Based on a bargaining game model under the conduction of asymmetric status and incomplete information, the paper proposes a method determining the risk sharing ratio between government and private sectors during the exploitation process of China＇s non-resident island PPP project, and a case is used to verify the model. The results show that risk sharing ratio between government and private sectors is related to the asymmetry of the status and the loss coefficient of negotiation, which should be concerned by both sides. The findings of this paper provide a theoretical basis for the fair and reasonable risk sharing, and also have a certain guiding significance to promote the exploitation of China＇s non-resident island PPP projects.