摘要
基于间接平衡论,以2007—2016年中国沪深两市302家上市公司为样本,研究了CEO任期对研发投入跳跃的前因影响,以及研发投入跳跃对企业长期绩效和短期绩效的后果影响。结果表明:研发投入正向跳跃对长期绩效产生积极影响,对短期绩效没有显著的积极影响;研发投入负向跳跃对短期绩效产生积极影响,对长期绩效产生消极影响;CEO任期越长,越不愿意进行研发投入正向跳跃,越愿意进行研发投入负向跳跃;技术能力正向调节CEO任期与研发投入正向跳跃的关系,负向调节CEO任期与研发投入负向跳跃的关系。
Based on the indirect equilibrium theory,this paper takes 302 listed companies in China from 2007 to 2016 as the sample to examine the antecedent impact of CEO＇s tenure on R＆D investment and the effect of R＆D investment jump on long term and shoreterm performance. The results show＂ as follows： R＆D investment forward jump has positive effects on long term performance and has no significant positive effects on shoreterm performance;R＆D investment negative jump has positive effects on shoreterm performance and negative effect on long term per formance; the longer the CEOs tenure, the less willing R＆D investment is jumping forward, but it is willing to make negative jumps in R＆D in vestment;technical ability regulates the relationship between CEO tenure and R＆D investment forward jump positively,regulates the relation ship between CEO tenure and R＆D investment negative jump negatively.
作者
李海东
王梦蕾
史寒之
Li Haidong;Wang Menglei;Shi Hanzhi(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China)
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第10期55-65,共11页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"社会资本
文化智力
团队学习与合作创新绩效:基于资源基础理论的实证研究"(71371177)
关键词
CEO任期
研发投入跳跃
企业绩效
企业技术能力
CEO tenure
R＆D investment jump
corporate performance
corporate＇s technical capability
