股票期权激励、债务契约与投资性房地产计量模式选择

Stock Option Incentive,Debt Contract and the Choice of the Investment Real Estate Measurement Model

本文以我国沪深两市2007~2016年间持有投资性房地产的非金融保险行业上市公司为对象,研究了股票期权激励与债务契约动因对投资性房地产公允价值计量模式选择的影响。研究发现,与未实施股票期权激励计划的公司相比较,实施股票期权激励的公司更可能对投资性房地产采用公允价值模式进行后续计量;公司对投资性房地产后续计量选择公允价值模式的概率,随债务水平的增高而增大;进一步分析发现,股票期权激励与债务契约动因对投资性房地产公允价值后续计量模式的选择存在交乘效应影响,实施股票期权激励会强化债务契约动因与投资性房地产公允价值后续计量模式选择之间的正相关关系。结果表明,强化审计监督,优化股票期权激励和债务契约的制定与执行,对于投资性房地产公允价值会计信息质量的提高具有非常重要意义。

Using samples of listed companies in China＇s Non-financial insurance industry with real estate investment in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2016, this paper studies the influence of motivation of stock option incentive and debt contract on the choice of lair value measurement model of real estate investment. The findings are as follows： The companies which implement stock option incentive plans are more likely to adopt a lair value model for real estate investment than those which do not implement stock option incentive. The higher the debt level of the company, the greater the probability for the lair value model to be used in the subsequent measurement of the real estate investment. Further analysis show that the motivation of stock option incentive and debt contract have an interaction ettect on the choice of lair value measurement model of real estate investment, and the implementation of stock option incentive will strengthen the positive relationship between the choice of lair value measurement model of real estate investment and the motivation of debt covenants. These results indicate that it is very important to strengthen audit supervision and optimize the formulation and implementation of the stock option incentive and the debt contract for the improvement of the investment real estate lair value accounting information quality.