职务发明的权利配置与激励比较——基于道德风险的博弈分析

A Comparative Study on the Incentive of Right Allocation of Service Invention: Game Analysis Based on Moral Hazard

职务发明活动中存在着严重的信息不对称与道德风险,研发风险与市场风险的存在进一步增加了雇主通过激励方式克服或缓解发明人的道德风险的成本。在职务发明活动中,既有雇主所提供的物质技术条件的投入,也有发明人自身的人力资本的投入,双方之间的关系具有合作性冲突的特征;考虑到雇主既要投入巨额的研发成本,同时还要承担全部或者大部分的道德风险、研发风险与市场风险,"雇主优先"模式更为合理;对于发明人利用雇主的物质技术条件所完成的发明创造,其权利应优先归属于发明人;"科斯定理"仅从交易成本的角度揭示了权利配置与市场交易之间的关系问题,基于"禀赋效应"的存在,职务发明权利的不同配置模式具有不同的分配效应。

There are serious information asymmetry and moral hazard in the activity of service invention. The existence of R＆D risk and market risk further increases the cost of employers’ incentive to overcome or mitigate the inventor’s moral hazard. In the activity of service invention,there are not only the input of the material and technical conditions provided by the employer,but also the investment of the inventor’s own human capital. The relationship between employer and inventor is characterized by cooperative conflict. Considering that employer have to invest huge amounts of research and development costs,but also bear all or most of the moral hazard,R＆D risk and market risk,the ＂employer priority＂model is more reasonable. When the inventor use the employer’s material and technical conditions,the invention’s rights should be given priority to the inventor. Coase Theorem reveals the relationship between rights allocation and market transactions from the perspective of transaction cost. Based on the existence of endowment effect,different right allocation modes of service invention s have different distribution effects.