博弈视角下政府绩效评价的基础模型及其选择中的“绩效损失”

The Basic Models of Government Performance Measurement and Their "Performance Loss" in a Game Theory Perspective

政府绩效评价的复杂性来源于评价中的多重博弈关系、信息以及测量技术与工具的选择,从而使得评价结果产生"绩效损失"。本文运用博弈论的方法,归纳提炼政府绩效评价的基础理论模型,并从基础模型具有的单一功能出发,分析其特征与适用条件,进而研究在模型选择过程中不同环节上存在的"绩效损失",最后基于理论模型对现有地方政府综合评价模型选择中的"绩效损失"进行案例研究,并与国外评价的模型选择进行比较研究。

The complexity of government performance measurement is caused by the multiple game relationships existing in the measurement process, information and the selection of measurement techniques and tools, which results in the production of ＂performance loss＂. Based on the game theory, the paper constructs the basic models of government performance measurement. Then, it analyzes the features and application conditions of every model having single function, and the ＂performance loss＂ existing in the different stages of selecting the models. In the end, it adopts case studies to discuss ＂performance loss＂ of the comprehensive performance measurement implemented by the current local governments, so as to construct a general method for the basic performance measurement procedure.