企业家出身造成了产能过剩吗——来自中国企业—劳动力匹配调查(CEES)的经验证据

DOES ENTREPRENEUR IDENTITY CAUSE EXCESS CAPACITY——Empirical Evidence from China Employer-employee Survey

多年来,产能过剩一直是制约我国经济迈向高质量发展的重要障碍。与现有文献多从宏观产业政策层面研究上述问题有所不同,本文选取企业家公共部门出身这一微观视角,运用政治关联理论,就企业家出身造成我国企业产能过剩的微观机理进行了创新性的实证解释。运用"中国企业—劳动力匹配调查"(CEES)数据,本文的基准回归表明,为获取政治关联所带来的非市场回报,在其他因素既定的前提下,对于出身公共部门的企业家而言,其所在企业的产能过剩程度平均偏高13.9%,出现产能过剩问题的边际概率则平均偏高5.3%。内生性检验、中介效应模型的估计结果发现,与宏观产业政策相比,企业家公共部门出身对于产能过剩的影响效应具有更高的经济显著性,而过度投资则是其中的重要影响途径。运用上市公司的微观面板数据,同源性误差检验进一步支持了本文的主要实证发现。为此,本文的政策建议是:政府应该将政策重心从产业政策转向竞争性政策,通过构建公平竞争的市场环境,厘清政府与市场二者的边界,避免企业家依靠政治关联对政府资源的"俘获"。只有构建公平竞争的市场经济秩序,企业家的创新潜能才能得到充分释放,并从微观机理上解决我国的产能过剩问题。

Over the years, excess capacity has always been an important obstacle which restricts the economy of China developing towards high quality. Different from the existing literature which explains excess capacity from structural perspective, this paper selects the microscopic perspective which is about CEO coming from the public sector. Using the theory of political relevance, this paper empirically explains the influence of CEO coming from the public sector on excess capacity. Under the control of other factors, the basic regression, with the data from China Employer-employee Survey （CEES）, empirically considers that the enterprises whose CEO coming from the public sector have higher degree and marginal probability of excess capacity, which are about 13.9% and 5.3% respectively. That is because the enterprises them- selves are willing to obtain non-market returns through political connections. In addition, endogenous test and the mediating effect model find that compared with the macroscopic structural {actors, the influence of CEO coming from the public sector on excess capacity has higher economic significance and over- investment is one of the important ways of influence during this process. Finally, using the micro-panel data of listed companies, the common variance tests further support the main empirical findings of this paper. Therefore, the policy recommendations are as follows. The government should shift the focus of policy from industrial policy to competitive policy and clarify the boundary between the government and the market by constructing a fair competition market environment, which can prevent CEO to ＂capture＂ government resources relying on political connections. Only in this way, can the innovative potential of CEO be fully released and the problem of excess capacity in China be solved from microscopic mechanism.