僵尸企业、融资方式与信息透明度

Zombie Firms,Financing Mode and Information Transparency

2007-2016年A股上市公司数据为样本,考察了僵尸企业的信息透明度以及不同融资方式对僵尸企业信息透明度的影响差异。研究发现,僵尸企业存在利用盈余管理降低信息透明度的机会主义行为,并且银行提供的长期债务融资会加剧这种行为,而银行提供的短期债务融资能够缓解这种行为。僵尸企业的信息不透明会向同行业内其他非僵尸企业扩散,并且这种情况在金融发展较好的地区则更加明显。银行可以通过发放不同期限的贷款来影响僵尸企业的信息质量。研究结论可以为监管部门防范资本市场上僵尸企业"传染性"危害提供决策方面的参考。

Does zombie firms of listed companies have the behavior of reducing information transparency？If such a situation exists,will zombie firms affect non-zombie firms？What can be done to mitigate such behavior？In order to answer the above questions,this paper takes the data of listed companies from 2007 to 2016 as samples,investigates the information transparency of zombie firms and the impact of different financing mode on information transparency of zombie firms.The study have found that zombie firms tend to use earnings management to reduce information transparency,and the long-term debt financing provided by banks will exacerbate this behavior,and short-term debt financing provided by banks can alleviate this behavior.The study also found that,the information opacity of zombie firms will spread to other non zombie enterprises in the same industry,and this situation is more obvious in areas with better financial development.The conclusion of the study shows that banks can affect the information quality of zombie firms by issuing loans with different maturities.The conclusion also may help regulators pay attention to the＂infectivity＂of zombie firms in capital markets.