期刊文献+

市场界定在反垄断并购审查中的地位和作用 被引量:12

The Position and Functions of the Market Definitionin the Anti-monopoly Merger Review
原文传递
导出
摘要 为了判断一个企业并购是否损害市场竞争,反垄断执法机关一般都需要界定相关市场。因为市场界定可以说明市场竞争的范围,说明企业的市场份额和市场集中度,说明市场进入障碍和潜在的竞争,并由此提供一个智慧和系统的分析工具,帮助执法机构收集和评估竞争影响的各种证据。界定相关市场不仅是并购竞争分析的第一步,而且是关键性的步骤。市场界定作为并购竞争分析的基本方法,它不否认各种经济学方法的作用和功能,特别是UPP测试和并购模拟在这方面都有重要的应用价值。但是,不管这些经济学方法多么重要,它们的应用都只是并购竞争分析中的证据,而不能替代并购竞争分析中的相关市场界定。 In order to analyze whether a M&A will be harmful to market competition, it is usually necessary for the anti--monopoly enforcement agency to define the relevant market. Market definition is helpful to identifing the relevant product and geographical markets, to knowing the competitors and their respective market share and the market concentration, and to evaluating the harriers to entry and the po-tential competition. Therefore, market definition is not only the first step, but also the key step in the M&A competition investigation, and it provides a wise and systematical analytical tool in the process of collecting and evaluating all of evidence. As the basic reference in the M&A analysis, market definition does not eliminate various economies methods, such as the UPP test and merger simulations. But no mat ter how important these economic approaches are, their application is only helpful in getting supplemen-tary information and evidence in the M&A competition investigation, rather than replacing the market definition.
作者 王晓晔
出处 《中外法学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第5期1324-1338,共15页 Peking University Law Journal
基金 作者主持国家社会科学基金重大项目<垄断认定过程中的相关市场边界划分原则与技术研究>(项目编号:12&ZD200)的部分研究成果
关键词 反垄断法 企业并购控制 相关市场界定 UPP测试法 并购模拟 Anti-Monopoly Law Merger Control Market Definition Upward Pricing Pressure(UPP) Merger Simulation
  • 相关文献

参考文献1

二级参考文献10

  • 1张亚斌,黄苹.跨国并购影响东道国市场结构的福利效应分析[J].求索,2006(4):5-8. 被引量:2
  • 2郑迎飞,陈宏民.东道国政府干预条件下外资并购的市场结构效应[J].产业经济研究,2006(3):12-17. 被引量:6
  • 3莫塔.竞争政策--理论与实践[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2006.
  • 4BERGMAN M, JAKOBSSON M, RAZO C. An econometric analysis of the European commission's merger decisions [ J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2005, (9 - 10).
  • 5ASHENFELTER O, HOSKEN D. Price Effects of Consumer Product Market Mergers [ D]. Princeton University Working Pa- per, 2004.
  • 6DICK A R. If Cartels Were Legal, When Would They Fix Prices? [ M]//Peter Grossman, ed. , How Cartels Endure and How They Fail: Studies of Industrial Collusion, Chehenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004.
  • 7SLADE M. Merger simulations of unilateral effects: what can we learn from the UK brewing industry? [ D ]. Wrwick Eco- nomic Research Papers, 2006.
  • 8DAVIS P, HUSE C. Estimating the ' Coordinated Effects' of Mergers [ EB/OL]. 2009. http ://www. competition - commis- sion. gov. uk/our_ role/analysis/Peter% 20Davis _ Cristian% 20Huse_ 2010. pdf.
  • 9KOVACIC W E, MARSHALL R C, MARX L M, et al. Quantitative analysis of coordinated effects [ J ]. Antitrust law jour- nal, 2009, (76).
  • 10黄坤,张昕竹.可口可乐拟并购汇源案的竞争损害分析[J].中国工业经济,2010(12):86-96. 被引量:24

共引文献1

引证文献12

二级引证文献395

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部