竞争供应链环境下基于成本降低的流程创新选择

The Process Innovation of Competing Supply Chains under Cost Reduction

为降低生产成本,构建制造商是否进行流程创新的竞争供应链模型,采用Stackelberg博弈方法,以不进行流程创新为基准,识别流程创新实现供应链成员绩效改进的博弈均衡条件和占优均衡。研究发现,若创新投资系数较小,且横向竞争较弱,或者仅创新投资系数较大,则进行流程创新是实现上下游双赢的占优均衡决策。对供应链系统而言,若竞争对手不进行流程创新,则本链进行创新可实现Pareto改进,不受投资系数和竞争强度的影响;若竞争对手进行流程创新,则本链在横向竞争较弱和投资系数较小时可实现绩效改进;即使横向竞争非常激烈,提高投资系数亦可实现Pareto改进。

This study established a competing supply chain model that the manufacturer would decide whether to invest in process innovation to reduce the production cost. With the game theory of Stackelberg and the benchmarking of no innovation, it is identified that the game equilibrium conditions and dominant equilibrium of process innovation can improve the supply chain members＇ perform- ance. The results show that investing in process innovation is a dominant equilibrium which will realize the win-win of manufacturer and retailer when the coefficient of innovation investment is relatively small and the competition is relatively weak, or when the coefficient of innovation investment is rela- tively large and no matter how the intensity of competition is. If the competitor doesn＇t invest in the process innovation, the manufacturer in this supply chain investing in the process innovation will con- tribute the Pareto improvement to the whole supply chain system, which is not affected by the intensity of competitionand coefficient of innovation investment. However, if the competitor invests in the process innovation, the process innovation with relatively small investment coefficient in this supply chain will improve the performance of the whole supply chain when horizontal competition is relatively weak. What is more, even when the horizontal competition is very fierce, the manufacturer can realize Pareto improvement of the whole supply chain system by investing in process innovation with larger investment coefficient.