融券机制对上市公司信息披露违规行为存在治理效应吗

Can the Short Selling Inhibit the Illegal Actions of Information Disclosure?

利用2010年我国A股资本市场引入融券卖空机制这一准自然试验,采用双重差分法分析和检验了融券机制在对上市公司信息披露违规的预见性和抑制性方面的治理效应。结果发现,融券的卖空机制可以从微观层面对公司的信息披露行为产生影响,融券卖空者具备发现上市公司信息披露违规行为的能力,其可以合理预见公司的信息披露违规行为。这能在一定程度上对公司产生威慑力,降低公司信息披露违规的概率,提升公司信息披露的质量。进一步的研究发现,融券卖空机制的抑制公司信息披露违规、提高公司信息披露质量的治理效应在终极控股股东两权分离度高、管理层持股比例高的公司中发挥得更为显著,其能在一定程度上抑制终极控股股东和管理层两类上市公司内部权力主体在信息披露违规方面的机会主义行为。

Based on the pilot short selling in China in 2010,we analyzes and tests the governance effect of margin trading mechanism on the foresee ability and inhibition of information disclosure violations of listed companies. The results are as followings. Firstly,short-sellers have the ability to detect the information disclosure violations of listed companies,and can reasonably predict the company ＇s information disclosure violations. This can produce a deterrent to the company to a certain extent. Secondly,this deterrent effect can reduce the probability of violations of corporate information disclosure,and improve the quality of corporate information disclosure. Thirdly,these positive effects of short selling is more significant on the companies with high separation of the ultimate controlling shareholder between the cash flowpower and the control power,or with high proportion of managerial ownership. So,the short selling mechanism can inhibit the opportunistic behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholders and the executives such as the illegal actions of information disclosure,and can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.