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恶意欠薪问题的定量分析 被引量:1

A Quantitative Analysis of Malicious Wage Arrears
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摘要 在我国,拖欠工资现象仍广泛存在于某些行业中。它引发了被拖欠者的负面情绪,进而带来了种种社会问题,政府部门自然要干预其中。基于欠薪的动态决策过程,本文在劳动者负面情绪阈值的两种分布下,分别讨论了企业的欠薪行为,其结果非常直观地显示了企业恶意欠薪的根源在于"有利可图"。文章从量化角度明确了增强劳动者的维权意识是治理欠薪的有效途径,而政府干预是劳动者维权行为的必要保证。此外,建立随机检查机制可以让政府干预在治理欠薪中发挥出实际效果,政府也可以通过调控经济环境达到治理欠薪的目的。 In China, wage arrears are still widespread in some industries. Wage arrears will induce workers' neg- ative emotion which can cause serious social problems and government will certainly intervene. Under two differ- ent assumptions on the distribution of worker' s negative emotion threshold, the paper analyzes the firm' s actions, based on the dynamic decision process model for wage arrears. The results intuitively show that the firm' s ulterior motive for wage arrears is greed. From a quantitative perspective, the paper confirms that enhan- cing the workers' consciousness of rights safeguarding is always an effective method to solve wage arrears, and a government intervention is an essential prerequisite for workers' legal actions. Moreover, stochastic checking mechanism can be used to make government intervene in wage arrears governance more effectively. Besides toug- her punishments, government could also regulate and control financial markt^t~ to int,~rv,~np i
作者 刘文静 杨璐 刘克 王颖芝 LIU Wen-jing;YANG Lu;LIU Ke;WANG Ying-zhi(School of Mathematical Sciences,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China;Academy of Mathematics and Systems science,Chinese Academy of Sciences;Key Laboratory of Management,Decision and Information System,Chinese Academy of Science;University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China)
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2018年第11期61-69,共9页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专4(201713053) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(11501316,71390334,11271356)
关键词 动态决策 恶意欠薪 负面情绪 政府干预 dynamic decision malicious wage arrears negative emotion government intervention
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