巡视监督能够抑制公司的违规行为吗

Can Patrol Supervision Inhibit Corporate Illegal Behaviors

基于威慑效应和理性选择理论,运用双重差分模型检验十八大前后巡视监督对公司违规行为的影响。结果表明：巡视监督能显著减少国企违规的发生频率,减轻违规严重程度;巡视监督能够通过制约高管权力和削弱政治关联来抑制公司的违规行为。进一步研究发现,巡视监督对高管违规、信息披露违规的抑制作用要强于经营违规,且对市场化程度高地区及中央企业的威慑作用更为突出。这表明,巡视监督的＂威慑效应＂能抑制企业的违规行为。

Based on the deterrent effect and rational choice theory, this paper examined the impact of patrol supervision on corporate illegal behavior before and after the 18 th Party Congress. The empirical results show that, patrol supervision can significantly lower the frequency and severity of illegal behaviors in state-owned enterprises. And patrol supervision could inhibit corporate illegal behaviors through restraining executive power and weakening political connections. Further study shows that, patrol supervision can better inhibit executive violations and information disclosure violations than management irregularities, which phenomena is more obvious in regions with higher degree of marketization and central enterprises. We conclude that, patrol supervision has exerted obvious deterrent effect on corporate illegal behaviors.