摘要
传统的威慑理论认为,战略威慑目标国决策者通常具有理性,所谓理性指决策者始终把一个合乎规则的收益-损失计算作为自身政策抉择的基础。然而,作为一个普通人,目标国决策者的逻辑运算能力常常是有限的,加之威慑运行过程中存在许多不确定因素,逻辑思维的理论形态必定会在现实当中发生偏离。而且在有的场合,直觉比起逻辑思维来说对目标国决策者的决策更加具有解释力。因此,在复杂的国际关系当中,将战略威慑目标国决策者的决策思维设定在一种方式上明显偏离实际。
According to traditional deterrence theory, decision-makers of the target countries of the strategic deterrence are usually rational. The so-called rationalness refers to the fact that decision-makers alw ays keep a regular profit and loss calculation in mind for his policy choices. How ever,as human beings, decision-makers are limited in their logical reasoning ability. Moreover there are many uncertain factors during the operation of deterrence,so the practical form of logical reasoning is different from the theoretical form. And on some occasions,intuition exerts has more explanatory power than logical thinking to the decisionmakers' choice. Therefore, in the complicated international relations, the assumption that decision-makers have only one single w ay of thinking is deviated from the actuality.
作者
赵娟
天羽
Zhao Juan;Tian Yu
出处
《军事政治学研究》
2013年第2期83-95,共13页
Military Politics Review
关键词
战略威慑
目标国决策者
思维方式
Strategic Deterrence
Decision-makers of Target Countries
Ways ofThinking