创新券条件下政企博弈模型构建研究

Research on the Construction of Game Model between Government and Enterprise under the Condition of Innovative Voucher

创新券制度是一项促进中小企业创新发展、实现经济增长的政府投入政策。要确定创新券制度对企业创新是否有重大影响,就必须从政企之间的博弈关系模型出发,准确把握政企双方博弈均衡点,以及明确政府行为对企业技术革新产生的影响,从而确定创新券制度对企业创新的意义。虽然创新券制度对于企业创新具有十分重要的引导作用,但目前并不完善,尚未进行全面的推广。因此,要充分发挥创新券制度对企业创新的促进作用,就要求政府在实施政策时,从强化机构能力,加强顶层建设等方面入手,促进企业的创新发展。

Innovation voucher is one kind of government investment policies aiming at promoting the innovation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises. By constructing the dynamic game model between the government and enterprises under the condition of implementing the innovation voucher, this paper analyzes the equilibrium point of the game between the government and the enterprise. The influence of the government behavior on the technological innovation of the enterprise is also studied. It is suggested that that the government formulate reasonable strategies to reduce the innovation cost of small and medium-sized enterprises, to improve the innovation income and to promote the innovation and development of the enterprises. Finally, according to the analysis of the dynamic game model, it puts forward some suggestions on promoting the innovation of the enterprises.