董事会国际化、地区廉洁程度与研发投资

Boardroom Globalization,Regional Integrity and R&D Investment

在经济全球化时代,各级政府纷纷制定优惠政策吸引外籍人才来华工作,国外智力的流入效应成为学术研究的热点,并取得一些学术成果。很多中国企业邀请海外政要、学者或境外企业高管担任其董事,在董事会国际化方面进行了一些探索。尽管从国外高薪引智是提升企业竞争力的一条捷径,但鲜有学者实证检验董事会国际化与企业研发投资的关系。基于高层梯队理论框架,使用2006年至2015年沪深两市A股非金融行业上市公司的10 435个公司-年观测值,运用Stata 14. 0和OLS多元回归模型,以公司董事的国籍特征为切入点,实证分析董事会国际化与企业研发投资的关系,并研究地区廉洁程度对上述关系的调节作用。研究结果表明,外籍董事的加盟有助于提升公司的研发投资,外籍董事占比越大,公司的研发投资越多。公司所在地的廉洁程度越低,董事会国际化对研发投资的正向影响越大。聘用外籍独立董事和外籍普通董事都有助于提升公司的研发投资,但外籍独立董事对研发投资的影响强度大于外籍普通董事。在廉洁程度低的地区,外籍普通董事对研发投资的影响强度大于外籍独立董事。在稳健性检验中,替换研发投资的测量方式,将港澳台地区董事以及曾在国外留学或工作的国内董事也都视为国际化董事,发现董事会国际化与研发投资依然显著正相关。与降低董事会国际化程度相比,提高董事会国际化程度能显著提升公司的研发投资,表明国际化董事存在增量效应。国外智力流入对提升企业的研发投资具有积极效应,高层梯队理论有助于解释该效应,研究结果丰富了转型经济国家的公司治理理论。虽然外籍独立董事和外籍普通董事都有助于推动公司的研发投资,但在选择聘用哪类外籍董事时,建议公司先考虑其所在地的廉洁程度。另外,建议政府扮演好"扶持之手"的角色,使辖区内的公司能用最优惠的薪金聘用到最合适的外籍人才。

In the economic globalization era, to attract more foreign talents to work in China, many preferential policies are launched by the Central Government and some local governments in many provinces. The scholars also pay attention to the influx of foreign intelligence, and have acquired many academic achievements. Meanwhile, some foreign former politicians, foreign scholars or senior managers of foreign enterprises are hired as directors by some Chinese companies, and the boardroom globaliza- tion has existed in some local Chinese enterprises. Although hiring foreign intelligence can enhance firms＇ competitiveness quick- ly, few scholars have empirically studied the relationship between boardroom globalization and firm＇s R＆D investments. Under the framework of upper echelon theory, using the 10435 firm-year observations of China＇s A-share listed non-financialcompanies from 2006 to 2015, this paper empirically tests the relationship between boardroom globalization and firm＇s R＆D in- vestment, and the moderating effect of regional integrity by Stata 14.0 from the perspective of directors＇ nationalities, and through the OLS multiple regression method. The results show that boardroom globalization is positively related to firm＇s R＆D investment, and the more foreign directors are hired, the more R＆D investment will be. But the lower the regional integrity is, the stronger the above positive relation will be. Although the foreign dependent directors（FDDs） and the foreign independent directors（FIDs） can both enhance firm＇s R＆D investment, the FIDs can do better. However, the FDDs can do better in the lower integrity region. In the robust tests, using the alternative measure of R＆D investment, regarding the directors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Regions of China, and the domestic directors who have studied or worked abroad as the foreign directors, the boardroom globalization still influences firm＇s R＆D investment positively. In addition, comparing to the dismissal of foreign directors, hiring foreign directors can increase firm＇s R＆D investment. Thus, there is an incremental effect. Overall, the firm＇s R＆D investment can benefit from the influx of foreign intelligence, and the upper echelon theory can support this positive association perfectly. These results enrich the corporate governance theory in emerging markets. Although the foreign independent directors and the foreign dependent directors can both enhance firm＇s R＆D investment, the companies should consider the local political integrity firstly before deciding which directors are hired. And in the process of formulating for- eign experts＇ welfare policies, the local governments should give enough favor to the enterprises under their respective jurisdic- tion. Thus these companies can hire the right people to do the right things at the right price.