摘要
一国需要什么样的国防以及需要一支什么样的军队决定于政治精英对威胁的判断与感知。1949年以后特别是20世纪50年代中后期,毛泽东的威胁感知发生了嬗变,认为中国很快将与美苏展开一场总体战争甚至是"核战争"。在此背景下,中国军队的现代化、正规化建设被认为是"教条主义"而遭否弃,"政治挂帅"或"突出政治"的军队发展逻辑被重新确立。由此,中国军队便逐渐朝向一支依赖人力以及革命经验——而非武器装备和科技知识——的军队转型。
Political elites' threat perception determines the nature of a state's national defense and its army as well. Mao Zedong, whose threat perception underwent a striking transformation after 1949,especially in the late 1950 s, believed that China would soon be engaged in a total war or even a nuclear war with both USSR and USA. Consequently,the project of modernization and regularization of the PLA was discarded as"dogmatism ",and the principle of "politics in command"for the military development was reestablished. PLA was then gradually put on the track towards an army relying on manpower and revolutionary experience rather than weaponry and technology.
出处
《军事政治学研究》
2014年第4期60-74,共15页
Military Politics Review