社会责任信息、分析师跟踪与企业融资约束

Social Responsibility Information,Analysts Following and Corporate Financing Constraints

社会责任信息披露和分析师跟踪都可以改善企业的信息环境,从而影响融资约束水平。本文以2012-2015年沪深两市A股上市公司作为样本,实证检验了社会责任信息披露情况、分析师跟踪与融资约束之间的关系。研究结果表明：社会责任信息的披露和披露质量都可以降低企业融资约束程度,且这种缓解效应在非国有企业中更加显著;分析师跟踪在一定程度上可以降低企业的融资约束程度;相比于披露社会责任信息,当企业未披露社会责任信息时,较多的分析师跟踪人数可以显著降低融资约束水平,这体现了社会责任信息和分析师跟踪对融资约束的作用存在一定的替代效应。

The disclosure of corporate social responsibility information and analysts following can improve the information environment of enterprise,thus affects the level of financing constraints. In this paper,according to the data of Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2015,we study the relationship among the disclosure of corporate social responsibility information,analysts following and financing constraint. Empirical results show that： the disclosure of corporate social responsibility information and the CSR information quality can reduce the degree of financing constraints,and this kind of mitigation effect is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises; analysts following can reduce the degree of financing constraints of enterprises to a certain extent; compared with the disclosure of social responsibility information,when the enterprise does not disclose the social responsibility information,the higher analyst following can significantly reduce the level of financing constraints,which illustrates there exists the substitute association between corporate social responsibility information and analysts following on the effect of financing constraints.