管理层薪酬与公司并购重组决策——来自中国A股上市公司的证据

The Management Compensation and M&A Strategy——Evidence From Chinese A-shares Listed Companies

本文选取了2008-2014年中国A股上市公司管理层薪酬以及并购重组数据,从上市公司管理层行为角度出发,基于管理层薪酬对上市公司并购重组行为进行解释,通过构建回归模型,发现上市公司管理层薪酬和上市公司发生并购重组的可能性、并购重组的次数以及并购重组的绩效之间都存在着显著的正向关系。根据已有文献的研究,并购重组行为会对管理层薪酬产生显著的促进作用,为了解决固有的内生性问题,本文引入了＂八项规定＂作为外生的政策冲击,采用DID的方法,发现以上结果依旧显著。因此,进一步完善公司治理结构,健全对管理层的制约与激励机制才是保证公司长期稳定发展的关键。

By building regression models based on the management compensation and MA data of Chinese A-share listed companies between 2008-2014,this paper explores the effect of management compensation on MA behaviors of listed companies from the perspective of management behavior.This paper finds that the management compensation plays a significantly positive role on the possibility of MA,the times of MA and the MA performance.According to the existing literature,MA may have a significantly positive effect on the promotion of management compensation.In order to solve this endogenous problem,this paper introduces＂Eight Rules＂as an exogenous shock,using the method of DID,and finds the above results are still significant.Therefore,to further improve the corporate governance structure,the control and incentive mechanism for the management is the key to ensure the company＇s long-term and stable development.