会计稳健性与审计收费——基于管理者过度自信的抑制效应研究

Accounting Conservatism and Audit Fees——Based on the Suppression Effect of Manager’s Overconfidence

目前关于管理者过度自信与审计收费之间的关系研究比较少,且鲜有研究将管理者过度自信与会计稳健性联系起来,考察二者对审计收费的交互作用,这不利于在实务上为审计工作和企业管理提供理论指导。本文以2013-2016年全部A股上市公司为样本,采用固定效应模型来研究管理者过度自信、会计稳健性与审计收费三者之间的关系,研究发现：（1）管理者过度自信会导致审计收费增加;（2）会计稳健性越高,审计收费越低;（3）管理者过度自信会抑制会计稳健性与审计收费之间的负相关关系。

There is little research on the relationship between managers＇ overconfidence and audit fees at present.Also,less research associates managerial overconfidence with accounting conservatism and examines the interaction between the two on the audit fees,which is not conducive to provide theoretical guidance for audit work and corporate management in practice. This paper takes all A-share listed companies as samples and uses the fixed effect model to study the relationship among managers＇ overconfidence,accounting conservatism and audit fees. The result shows that managerial overconfidence can lead to increased audit fees and there is a significant negative correlation between accounting conservatism and audit fees. In addition,managerial overconfidence will restrain the negative correlation between accounting conservatism and audit fees.