基于演化博弈的京津冀雾霾治理环境规制政策研究

Evolutionary game analysis on haze governance in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei:based on a simulation tool for proposed environmental regulation policies

经济发展与生态环境博弈是当前中国转型发展的必然表现,政府作为环境保护主体行为的博弈性是现阶段中国式分权的必然结果。本文以京津冀及周边地区工业源雾霾治理为研究对象,提出中国式分权中央政府与地方政府委托代理框架下雾霾治理的基本假设,尝试从环境规制执行视角对中央指导、地方响应和企业执行的理想化"合作"博弈提出解决方案。以此构建了中央政府、地方政府与污染企业三方非合作演化博弈模型,借助数值模拟技术对中央政府调控地方政府和污染企业实现理想演化博弈均衡的政策工具进行实证分析。研究发现,中央环保督查行政管制、"奖优罚劣"的专项转移支付、环保履责不力的政治处罚和环境保护税收留地,这些环境规制政策工具能够解决地方政府和污染企业在雾霾治理集体行动中存在的目标不一致性问题。具体来看,中央环保督查强化了地方政府和污染企业在专项转移支付和环境税收收入"奖优罚劣"的规制刚性。三种政策工具的组合使用使得污染企业走向执行减排的演化稳定策略,而地方政府的演化稳定策略是不监管。将环保履责不力的政治损失纳入地方政府效用函数,震慑于中央政府政治处罚,监管成为地方政府的演化稳定策略,而环境保护税收收入全部留存能够在一定程度上摊薄地方政府政治损失。进一步研究表明,对于治理成本的预期是地方政府和污染企业以利益最大化原则作出治理决策的重要依据。因此,为了实现雾霾治理理想演化稳定均衡的帕累托改进,中央政府需要增强中央环境管理集权,避免地方环境规制失灵;扩大中央环保支出范围,建立地方减排补偿机制;强化地方政府环保履责,提高环境税征收标准;支持企业环境技术创新,引导公众第三方监管。

The game of econonfic development and ecological environment is the inevitable performance of China＇ s current transitional development. Government＇ s game behavior as the environmentalist is the inevitable result of Chinese-style decentralization at this stage. This paper takes the industrial haze governance of the BeijingTianjinHebei and surrounding areas as its research object, puts forward the principalagent model of the bureaucracy under the framework of the Chineses-style decentralization, and tries to find a solution to the idealized ＇ cooperation＇ game between central government guidance, local government response and enterprise enfission reduction from the perspective of environmental regulation implementation. In this way, a noncooperative evolutionary game model for the incomplete implementation of environmental regulation between central government, local governments and polluting enterprises is constructed. A simulation tool for proposed environmental regulation policies is used to analyze how central government controls local governments and polluting enterprises to realize ideal evolutionary game equilibrium. Model estimates indicate that such a set of tools, the administrative management of centralized environmental supervision, the transfer payment of reward and punishment system, the political punishment for environmental irresponsibility and the policy of environmental protection retained local tax revenue, are employed to solve problems involving inconsistent goals of local governments and polluting enterprises in the collective action of air pollution joint control. In more concrete terms, the central environmental supervision has strengthened the regulatory administration and organizational rigidity of ‘reward and punishment＇ for local governments and polluting enterprises in the special transfer payment and environmental tax revenue. The combination of the three policy instruments makes the polluting enterprises move toward the evolutionarily stable strategy of implementing emission reduction, while the local government＇ s evolutionary stable strategy is not regulated. Introducing the political losses of poor environmental performance into the utility function, the local government＇ s evolutionary stable strategy turns into regulation because of the political punishment that is shocked by the central government. The retention of environmental protection tax revenues can dilute the political losses of local governments to a certain extent. However, a general finding is that the expectation of costs is an important reference for local government and polluting enterprises to make governance decisions based on the principle of maximizing profits. Therefore, in order to achieve Pareto improvement in the ideal evolutionary game equilibrium, it is necessary for the central government to strengthen centralized environmental management to avoid failure of local environmental regulations, and expand the scope of environmental protection expenditure to establish compensation mechanisms for emission reduction. Moreover, the central government should strengthen the environmental responsibility of local governments, support environmental technology innovation of polluting enterprises, improve the standards of environmental tax and guide public thirdparty supervision.