基于委托—代理模型的激励机制对商业银行反洗钱有效性分析

The analysis of the effectiveness of incentive mechanism based on principal-agent model to the anti money laundering in commercial banks

以委托—代理模型为工具,假定约束制度已经完善的前提下,建立监管机构对商业银行的反洗钱激励机制,分析和讨论激励机制的可行性和有效性,从模型分析可以得出:实施激励机制可以减少商业银行纵容洗钱的违规行为,增加商业银行反洗钱的努力程度,激励机制可以提高商业银行和监管机构的反洗钱期望效用;在引入外部变量带入激励合同后,提高了反洗钱分享系数。在开展反洗钱工作中建立配套激励机制是非常必要的。

Taking the principal-agent model as a tool,assuming the constraint system has been established,the establishment of regulatory agencies on the commercial bank incentive mechanism of anti money laundering,the analysis and discussion of the feasibility and effectiveness of the incentive mechanism have been discussed in this article.From the model analysis,it can be drawn that: the implementation of incentive mechanism can reduce the money laundering violations in commercial bank,increase the effort level of counter money laundering in commercial bank.The incentive mechanism can improve the expected utility of anti money laundering in commercial banks and regulatory agencies; after introducing external environmental variables into the incentive contract,it will improve the anti money laundering sharing coefficient.In the work of carrying out anti money laundering,the establishment of incentive mechanism is very necessary.