风险投资基金经理的道德风险防范

Guard Moral Hazard of Manager of Venture Capital Fund

运用剩余索取权和剩余控制权等企业理论成果,结合风险投资的特点和我国风险投资基金的实际,剖析风险投资行业的道德风险问题。通过探讨风险投资经理的激励和监管机制,设计与有效的激励相容的合同,以解决信息不对称、权责不对等的问题。

By using the research results of firm theory such as residual claim and residual rights of control,and by exami ning char-acteristics of venture investment a nd mechanism of venture capital fund in our country,this paper moral haza rd of venture investment industry.By discussing the incentive and monitoring mechanism of manager of venture capital fund,this paper endeavors to find out a way to design effective incentive co mpatibility contacts and solve info rmation asymmetry and right-duty asymmetry problem.