摘要
In emerging markets, the deviation between the ultimate controlling shareholders' voting rights and their cash flow rights(hereafter "DVC") in the listed firms is quite prevalent. DVC could be introduced due to the ultimate controlling shareholders' opportunistic incentives, as well as by their incentives to improve firm efficiency. This study uses 229 listed firms ultimately controlled by individuals or families(hereafter "entrepreneurial firms") for 2004 in China, to investigate the effect of DVC on firm value and to determine whether it is different between founder and non-founder controlled firms. We find that DVC has a positive effect on firm value for founder controlled firms. This result implies that investors believe that their interests are better protected by founder controlled firms than by non-founder controlled firms.
In emerging markets, the deviation between the ultimate controlling shareholders' voting rights and their cash flow rights(hereafter 'DVC') in the listed firms is quite prevalent. DVC could be introduced due to the ultimate controlling shareholders' opportunistic incentives, as well as by their incentives to improve firm efficiency. This study uses 229 listed firms ultimately controlled by individuals or families(hereafter 'entrepreneurial firms') for 2004 in China, to investigate the effect of DVC on firm value and to determine whether it is different between founder and non-founder controlled firms. We find that DVC has a positive effect on firm value for founder controlled firms. This result implies that investors believe that their interests are better protected by founder controlled firms than by non-founder controlled firms.
基金
funded by the grants from the National Social Science Foundation of China(No.06BJY016)
the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.70772101)
the Major Project of Key Research Base on Humanities and Social Science of Ministry of Education of China(No.07JJD630007)
