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A survey of executive compensation contracts in China's listed companies 被引量:15

A survey of executive compensation contracts in China's listed companies
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摘要 We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than localgovernment-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cashbased payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts.But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007. We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than localgovernment-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cashbased payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts.But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.
出处 《China Journal of Accounting Research》 2013年第3期211-231,共21页 中国会计学刊(英文版)
基金 the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC No.71272074) the Excellent Young Professors Program of the Shanghai Government
关键词 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE Incent Executive compensation Voluntary disclosure Incentives Performance measures
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