期刊文献+

Short sellers' accusations against Chinese reverse mergers: Information analytics or guilt by association?

Short sellers' accusations against Chinese reverse mergers: Information analytics or guilt by association?
原文传递
导出
摘要 This paper studies short sellers' trading strategies and their effects on the financial market by examining their accusations of fraud against Chinese reverse merger firms(CRMs) in the US. We find that short sellers rely on firms' fundamental information, especially relative financial indicators, to locate their "prey." Specifically, they compare a target firm's financial indicators(e.g., growth and receivables) with both the industry average and the firm's history. We find no evidence that short sellers accuse CRMs simply because of their reverse merger label. Additionally, we test the accuracy of short sellers' accusations in the long run and find that accused firms are more likely to delist and less likely to recover from price plunges. Our results also indicate that CRMs' high exposure to short sellers' accusations stem from adverse selection problems: firms with high litigation risk are more likely to choose reverse mergers to access the US capital market. Overall, our results support the view that short sellers are sophisticated investors and shed some light on their decision processes. This paper studies short sellers’ trading strategies and their effects on the financial market by examining their accusations of fraud against Chinese reverse merger firms(CRMs) in the US. We find that short sellers rely on firms’ fundamental information, especially relative financial indicators, to locate their "prey." Specifically, they compare a target firm’s financial indicators(e.g., growth and receivables) with both the industry average and the firm’s history. We find no evidence that short sellers accuse CRMs simply because of their reverse merger label. Additionally, we test the accuracy of short sellers’ accusations in the long run and find that accused firms are more likely to delist and less likely to recover from price plunges. Our results also indicate that CRMs’ high exposure to short sellers’ accusations stem from adverse selection problems: firms with high litigation risk are more likely to choose reverse mergers to access the US capital market. Overall, our results support the view that short sellers are sophisticated investors and shed some light on their decision processes.
出处 《China Journal of Accounting Research》 2015年第2期111-131,共21页 中国会计学刊(英文版)
基金 supported by the China Scholarship Council
关键词 Chinese reverse mergers FRAUD ACCUSATION GUILT by Chinese reverse mergers Fraud accusation Guilt by
  • 相关文献

参考文献15

  • 1Stephen E. Christophe,Michael G. Ferri,Jim Hsieh.Informed trading before analyst downgrades: Evidence from short sellers[J]. Journal of Financial Economics . 2009 (1)
  • 2Jap Efendi,Anup Srivastava,Edward P. Swanson.Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors[J].Journal of Financial Economics.2007(3)
  • 3Jeffrey Doyle,Weili Ge,Sarah McVay.Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics.2006(1)
  • 4Charles M Jones,Owen A Lamont.Short-sale constraints and stock returns[J]. Journal of Financial Economics . 2002 (2)
  • 5Patricia M Dechow,Amy P Hutton,Lisa Meulbroek,Richard G Sloan.Short-sellers, fundamental analysis, and stock returns[J]. Journal of Financial Economics . 2001 (1)
  • 6Lys T;R L Watts.Lawsuits against Auditors,1994(zk).
  • 7Altman E I.Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy[].The Journal of Finance.1968
  • 8Itay Goldstein,Alexander Guembel.Manipulation and the allocational role of prices. The Review of Economic Studies . 2008
  • 9JONATHAN M. KARPOFF,XIAOXIA LOU.Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct. The Journal of Finance . 2010
  • 10Jagan Krishan,Jayanthi Krishnan.Litigation risk and auditor resignations. The Accounting Review . 1997

共引文献25

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部