合伙与封闭公司中的点杀出局条款——法律比较与经济理论的进路

Shoot-out Clauses in Partnerships and Close Corporations:An Approach from Comparative Law and Economic Theory

在两人合伙或封闭公司中,点杀出局条款逐渐成为一种解决公司僵局的流行方式,并常被写入最初合作协议。其运用允许两个合作者中的一个根据严格正式的价格确定程序收购合伙中的全部权益。本文展示了在英美法合同实践中各种不同类型的点杀出局条款及其内容,这些条款正逐渐在欧洲大陆也获得热议。随之本文将从经济分析的角度考察点杀出局条款的优势与不足。紧接着本文将聚焦于这些条款在德国、奥地利、英国和美国合伙法和公司法中的可行性与不确定性,最终本文指出,英格兰和美国的法律实践显示,点杀出局条款虽常在合作协议中被引入,但实际实施率并不高,它们的价值更多地体现为威慑效力。

This article analyses shoot-out clauses as a popular means of resolving deadlocks in two member partnerships or close corporations,which are usually written into the contract in the beginning of the cooperation.Their use allows one of the two partners to purchase all interests in the partnership according to a strictly formalised price identification process.The article presents the different varieties of shoot-out clauses developed in Anglo-American legal practice that are being increasingly widespread in the European continent.It goes on to look at their advantages and disadvantages by exploring in a view of economic analysis.Then,it focuses on the permissibility of these clauses and the doubts cast upon them in Germany,Austria,England and the United States partnership law and company laws.Finally,practical experience from England and the United States has shown that although shoot-out clauses are often included in partnership agreements,they are only rarely executed,meaning that their value lies more in their deterrent effect with regard to termination.