摘要
文章研究了券商所参股基金公司的重仓持股对旗下分析师评级客观性的影响以及市场对这种利益冲突行为的反应。研究发现:(1)关联分析师对参股基金公司重仓持有股票的评级显著高于非关联分析师,而且其乐观程度与券商参股比例、参股基金公司规模以及股票在关联基金公司投资组合中的比重成正比。(2)关联分析师的乐观评级主要针对绩优基金的重仓股,对新基金和绩差基金重仓股的评级则与非关联分析师不存在显著差异。(3)投资者并不能有效识别这种利益冲突行为,关联评级仍会对投资者行为产生显著影响,相同评级下关联评级与非关联评级的短期市场反应并无显著差异,但其长期投资价值显著低于非关联评级。
This paper studies the impact of affiliated funds' Chong Cang stockholding on the objectiveness of analysts' recommendations and market reaction to this interests conflict.It arrives at the following conclusions:firstly,the recommendations of affiliated analysts on affiliated funds' Chong Cang Gu are substantially more favorable than independent analysts,and the optimism extent is positively related to the proportion of shareholding,the size of affiliated fund companies and stock weight in affiliated fund companies' portfolios;secondly,the optimistic recommendations of affiliated analysts mainly focus on Chong Cang Gu of funds with good performance,and the recommendations on new funds and Chong Cang Gu of funds with poor performance are not significantly different from ones of independent analysts;thirdly,investors cannot effectively recognize this interests conflict,and affiliated analysts' recommendations still have positive impacts on investor behavior;and there is no significant difference between short-term market reaction of affiliated and independent analysts' recommendations under the same recommendations,but the long-term investment value of affiliated recommendations are far lower than the one of independent recommendations.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期118-131,共14页
Journal of Finance and Economics