生态转移支付对地方政府环境治理的激励效应——基于东部六省46个地级市的经验证据

On the Incentive Effect of Ecological Transfer Payments on Environmental Governance of Local Governments:Evidence from 46 Eastern Prefecture-level Cities

文章基于我国财政分权体制下生态转移支付为地方政府环境治理提供激励创新政策工具并已开展实践探索的现实背景,从区分各省不同的激励方式入手,采用东部六省46个地级市2005-2010年的样本数据,在构建地方政府响应函数的基础上,利用空间计量模型识别出这项制度创新对城市环境治理的激励效应。研究表明:(1)"奖励型"和"惩罚型"两种不同的激励方式产生了不同的制度效果,前者有助于提升环境投入,后者有助于强化环境规制。此外,采取直接筹资和一般性拨款对激励效果也具有促进作用。(2)地区间恶性环境竞争、高污染行业比重过大和地方财政能力不足都会阻碍制度效果的产生,其负面效应甚至可能超过生态转移支付的正面作用。这说明现行体制限制了生态转移支付激励作用的发挥。(3)目标协调和制度设计是提高激励效果的关键,目标协调应以扩大地方政府生态服务职能和弱化"牺牲环境换取增长"的动机为先导,制度设计应以提高地方政府治理意愿和治理能力为根本。

Based on the real background that ecological transfer payments as an incentive innovation policy tool for environmental governance of local governments has been adopted by many provinces in China,this paper discriminates different provincial incentives and employs a spatial model to identify the incentive effect of this institutional innovation on urban environmental governance through the data of 46 eastern prefecture-level cities from 2005 to 2010and the construction of response function of local governments.It arrives at the results as follows:firstly,award-based and punishment-based incentives have different institutional effects;the former helps to advance environmental input and the latter strengthen environmental regulation;in addition,direct funding and general appropriation also play an active role in incentive effects;secondly,interregional malignant environmental competition,excessive high proportion of high-pollution industries and weak local fiscal capability can hinder the emergence of institutional effects and the negative impact may be stronger than the positive impact of ecological transfer payments,showing that current institutional base inhibits the exertion of the incentive role of ecological transfer payments;thirdly,target coordination and institutional design are the key to the increase in incentive effects,namely target coordination should be oriented by expanding ecological services function of local governments and weakening the motive that environment is sacrificed to growth,and institutional design should be based on the increase in governance willingness and capability of local governments.