“高官”还是“高薪”:何种更易留人?

“High Officials” or “High Compensations”:Which One is More Likely to Retain Talents?

文章基于经理人市场理论和契约参照点理论,以中国上市公司2007-2016年数据为样本,从多维薪酬参照点效应角度,探究了CEO的货币薪酬和晋升激励对其主动离职行为的影响。研究发现,CEO的货币薪酬和晋升激励都抑制了其主动离职行为,而晋升激励的抑制作用更强;当上一期CEO薪酬低于参照点薪酬时,当期越容易发生主动离职;当存在多维薪酬参照点效应时,CEO的货币薪酬和晋升激励仍能抑制其主动离职行为,但两种激励方式同时存在时,外部参照点效应下货币薪酬激励的抑制作用更加显著,而个人参照点效应下晋升激励的抑制作用更加显著。进一步研究发现,对国有企业来说,实施晋升激励更能留住人才。文章不仅丰富了经理人市场理论的研究,还为企业如何选择有效的激励方式来留住人才提供了参考。

'The Strategy of Talented Persons Powering the Nation' has become a basic strategy for China’s economic and social development. Talents are not only important to improving China’s competitiveness and comprehensive strength,but also related to the development of enterprises. As the senior management talent of enterprises,the CEO directly affects the stability of the senior management team and the competitiveness of enterprises. However,there is little literature that explores the impact of CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of non-compensation incentives at present,particularly in terms of CEO promotion incentives. When there are both compensation incentives(monetary compensation incentives) and noncompensation incentives(promotion incentives),which incentives are more effective? This question has not been clearly answered in previous literature studies. Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to explore how to retain CEO talents.and the theory of contract reference point for the first time. By sorting out relevant data manually including CEO promotion,CEO voluntary turnover,CEO characteristic variables and so on,this paper uses the multiple regression analysis to empirically explore the impact of monetary compensation incentives and promotion incentives on CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of the multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect,and uses the two-stage regression analysis of instrumental variables to solve endogenous problems. At the same time,this paper uses the multiple regression analysis to explore the impact of factors such as political promotion,property and salary fluctuations on CEO voluntary turnover in the further research. Finally,the accuracy of the research conclusions is verified by various robustness tests. The results of empirical studies indicate that both monetary compensation incentives and promotion incentives can inhibit CEO voluntary turnover. However,when both incentives exist simultaneously,promotion incentives have a stronger inhibitory effect on CEO voluntary turnover. When the CEO compensation is lower than the reference point compensation in the previous period,more prone the CEO is to voluntarily turnover in this period. When there is a multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect,compensation incentives and promotion incentives can still inhibit CEO voluntary turnover. However,when the two incentive modes exist simultaneously,the inhibition of compensation incentives on CEO voluntary turnover is more significant under the external reference point effect,while the inhibition of promotion incentives on CEO voluntary turnover is more significant under the individual reference point effect. The further research finds that compared with non-state-owned enterprises,promotion incentives of state-owned enterprises can inhibit CEO voluntary turnover more effectively. After considering the impact of endogenous problems,the above conclusions are still established. This paper has the following revelations: First,we should adopt different methods of incentives to retain CEO talents. We must pay attention not only to the role of monetary compensation incentives in retaining talents,but also to the supplement and effects of promotion incentives when monetary compensation incentives are insufficient. Second,we should strengthen the understanding of the multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect. We must fully understand CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of the multi-dimensional reference point effect at present,and take effective incentives based on specific reasons for the CEO’s resignation. Third,we should pay attention to the role of compensation incentives in the reform of the compensation system of state-owned enterprises. It is recommended to combine short-term monetary compensation incentives with long-term equity incentives. This paper has the following contributions:(1) It expands the research on the reference point effect,and considers the impact of the multi-dimensional salary reference point such as the external reference point,the internal reference point and the personal reference point on CEO voluntary turnover.(2) It enriches the research of the manager market theory.(3) It deepens the understanding on how to retain talents effectively,providing theoretical and empirical support for how to choose effective incentives and formulate policies of gaining CEO talents.