摘要
以2005—2012年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验环境不确定性条件下高管权力对企业过度投资行为的影响机制。研究发现:高管权力对过度投资的影响与企业终极控制人的性质具有显著关系,在国有终极控制的企业中高管权力会削弱过度投资,而在民营终极控制的企业中高管权力则会增加过度投资;在国有终极控制的企业中环境不确定性会加剧高管权力引致的过度投资,而在民营终极控制企业中环境不确定性会减弱高管权力引致的过度投资。
The paper empirically investigates the relationship between CEO power and overinvestment under the condition of environmental uncertainty by analyzing A- share listed firms between 2005 and2012. The study indicates that the properties of ultimate shareholders have significant influence on the relationship between CEO power and overinvestment. Overinvestment is positively related to CEO power among privately controlled listed firms,whereas overinvestment is negatively related to CEO power among government- controlled ones. Environmental uncertainty will exacerbate the overinvestment induced by CEO pow-er among government- controlled listed firms,while environmental uncertainty will result in the opposite effect among privately controlled ones.
出处
《财贸研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期111-121,共11页
Finance and Trade Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于战略性信息披露的公司治理溢价研究"(71172067)
国家社会科学基金青年项目"高管过度自信
财务冗余对企业创新的影响及对策研究"(13CGL034)
天津市教委重大项目"天津市混合所有制企业的高管权力形成机制及经济后果研究"(2014ZD52)
关键词
环境不确定性
高管权力
过度投资
environmental uncertainty
CEO power
overinvestment
