商业银行综合经营的“契约模式”及监管问题研究

A Study of the Contract Mode and Regulation of Commercial bank’s Intergrated Operation

国内银行综合经营的商业模式中存在一种非经资本(股权)联结,而经由合作协议联结的"契约模式"。从其动因来看,主要是出于对不同监管管辖权下净监管负担差异的选择性回避。本文通过以银信合作理财业务为例进行实证,发现该模式具有单体风险隐匿性和风险暴露的政策敏感性两大特征。契约模式监管的主要问题在于不同监管主体之间的监管竞争。无论是"趋利式竞争"还是"避害式竞争","学习示范效应"都将使监管套利行为进一步扩大。建议在加强风险监测和预警的基础上,综合运用监管工具和构建更有力的监管协作机制,同时加大引入第三支柱市场约束力量。

Among the modes of domestic bank's intergrated operation,there is a contract mode that is not linked by capital(equity)but by cooperation agreement.The main motivation of the mode is the selective avoidance of the net regulatory burden difference under different regulatory jurisdiction.Taking the wealth management business based on bank-trust cooperation as sample,this paper presents an empirical analysis and finds that the mode has two characteristics that the single risk is hidden and the risk exposure is sensitive to policy.The main problem in the regulatory of contract mode is the regulatory competition between the different regulators.Whether the benefit-pursuit competition or the loss-avoidance competition,the learning-demonstration effect will further promote the happening of regulatory arbitrage.On the basis of strengthening risk monitoring and early warning,it is proposed to use regulatory tools comprehensively,build a more powerful regulatory coordination mechanism and increase the introduction of market constraints as the third pillar in the meanwhile.