激励方式、行长权力强度与绩效

Incentives, CEO’s Power and Bank’s Performance

文章选取2006～2010年中国A股市场16家上市银行为样本,研究不同激励方式与银行绩效的关系,并进一步检验行长权力强度是否使这一关系发生变化。同时,基于Oaxaca分解法分析行长权力强度对不同激励方式的解释能力。结果发现:(1)在三种激励方式中,政治激励能显著地提高绩效,但股权激励与绩效却没有明确的关系;(2)在行长权力强度较高时,薪酬激励与绩效的关系由负相关转变为正相关,政治激励、股权激励与绩效的关系却没有发生变化;(3)行长权力强度对薪酬激励差异的解释能力最强,政治激励次之,股权激励最弱。

This paper selects 16 listed banks in Chinese A-share market from 2006 to 2010 as samples to reaearch the relationships between the different incentives and bank’s performance and further test whether the strength of the power changes the relationships. Based on the Oaxaca decomposition method, the paper analyses the function of CEO’s power strength to explain different incentives. The results show that: (1)among the three types of incentives, the political incentive can significantly improve the performance, but the equity incentive has no clear relationship with the performance; (2)while the CEO’s power is relatively big, the relationship between salary incentive and performance changes from the negative correlation to the positive correlation, but the relationship between salary political/equity incentive and performance does not change; (3)the function of CEO’s power strength to explain the difference in salary incentive is the best, followed by political incentive, and that of equity incentive is the worst.