内部控制质量影响银行借款契约的条款设置吗?——基于融资成本与期限结构视角的研究

Does Internal Control Quality Affect Banks to set the Stipulations of Loan Contracts——A Study from the Perspective of Financing Costs and Term Structure

本文以融资成本和借款期限作为银行借款契约的代理变量,实验检验内部控制质量、企业规模与银行借款契约的关系。研究显示:提升内部控制质量有助于企业获得较低的借款融资成本和较长的借款期限;银行债权人出于自我保护动机导致了债务人的企业规模会影响借款契约条款的设置,即与小规模企业相比,大规模企业获得了更为宽松的借款契约条款;与大规模企业相比,高质量的内部控制对降低借款融资成本和获得较长期限的贷款在小规模企业中更为显著。因此,企业为获得更为宽松的借款契约条款,应加强和完善内部控制制度建设,同时,小规模企业应适时扩大规模分散风险。

This paper uses financing cost and term structure as the proxy variables of bank loan contract for the empirical test of relationship between internal control quality, enterprise size and bank loan contract. The research shows that the improvement in internal control quality is conducive to enterprises to gain low-cost and long-term loans; bank creditors' motivation for selfprotection causes the result that size of debtor's enterprise will affect the setting of the stipulations of loan contract, which is means that, compared with small-size enterprises, the stipulations of loan contract for large-size enterprises are more lenient;due to the'credit-size discrimination', the effect that high-quality internal control reduces the financing costs of loans and increases loan term in small-size enterprises is more obvious than that in large-size enterprises. Therefore, for more lenient loan contract stipulations, enterprises should strengthen and improve the construction of internal control systems, and meanwhile,small-size enterprises should timely expand size to disperse risks.