公共执法的经济学理论

The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

本文考察了公共执法——即通过公共机构(检查员、核税官、警察、检察官)发现和制裁法律规则的违反者——的理论。我们首先提出了这一理论的基本要素,聚焦于施加制裁的概率、制裁的大小和形式以及责任规则。随后我们审视了这一核心理论的各种扩展,涉及到偶然损害、执行罚款的成本、错误、综合性执法、边际威慑、委托—代理关系、和解、自首、累犯、有关罚款概率和量度的不完全信息以及剥夺能力。

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors,tax auditors,police prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules.We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions,the magnitude and form of sanctions,and the rule of liability.We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory,concerning accidental harms,costs of imposing fines,errors, general enforcement,marginal deterrence,the principal-agent relationship,settlements,self reporting,repeat offenders,imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines,and incapacitation.