中国县乡政府的压力型体制:一个实证分析框架

Pressurized System of Local Government in China: an Empirical Investigation

基于一个具有全国代表性的跨年度调查数据,本文在实证上测度了县政府、乡镇政府、村两委之间的"压力型体制"。分析结果表明,"压力型体制"在不同地区之间存在很大差异,乡村两级干部较为普遍地、有选择性地执行上级的考核任务,考核压力在多个行政层级之间的传递呈现明显的衰减特征。农业税费改革之后,财政体制的集权有助于强化县乡之间的控制力度,却没有显著增强乡镇政府对村两委的控制力。

Based on a nationally representative survey data over three year periods,this paper empirically investigates the pressurized system which exists among county,township,and village levels. The findings indicate that there significantly exists the regional difference for the content and evolution of the pressurized system. It is quite common that the local cadres at township and village levels tend to selectively implement the mandatory tasks by the upper level government,which leads to the declining capacity of the policy mandates. The rural tax reform based on the centralized fiscal policies strengthened the administrative control of county- township system rather than township- village system.