产品市场竞争、CEO过度自信与过度投资

Product Market Competition,CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment

本文基于行为金融理论和产品市场竞争理论,选用2011~2013年我国A股上市公司数据作为研究样本,聚焦企业投资决策的核心主体——企业CEO,引入产品市场竞争这一外部环境视角,对上市公司CEO过度自信与过度投资之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:我国企业CEO过度自信倾向较为普遍,过度投资现象也较严重,CEO过度自信与过度投资呈正相关关系;外部产品市场竞争能有效地抑制企业过度投资行为,并对由CEO过度自信引发的过度投资具有调节作用,表现在产品市场竞争会降低CEO过度自信水平,并进而约束企业过度投资行为。鉴于目前国内外学者对过度投资的研究主要集中在委托代理关系和信息不对称等视角,本研究认为,企业过度投资还受到内部决策者CEO个人特质和外部竞争环境的双重影响。研究结论为深刻理解外部产品市场竞争环境和内部管理者特质对企业投资决策的影响提供了新的经验证据,并对从内外部公司治理视角规范企业投资行为具有一定的借鉴意义。

With data from A-share listed companies in China from 2011 to 2013, this paper explores the influence of CEO overconfidence and product market competition of a company on its overinvestment behavior. The theoretical basis of this study are behavioral finance theory and product market competition theory. It turns out that there is a positive correlation between CEO overconfidence and overinvestment since they are quite pervasive nowadays among listed companies in China. Moreover, the external product market competition forms a strong restraint and regulation towards the firm's overinvestment decision. The high intensity of product market competition will constrain the firm's overinvestment through decreasing the CEO's overconfidence level. Given that the existing researches concerning overinvestment mainly refer to principal-agent relationship, this paper comprehensively takes CEO's personal temperament of overconfidence and product market competition in its research. As a result, this study contributes to the researches concerning the effect of market competition and CEO's personal traits on the firm's overinvestment. It will also bring both firms and readers with new enlightenment on the regulation of the firm's investment policy through internal and external corporate governance.