管理者能力与企业业绩预告

Managerial Ability and Earnings Preannouncement

本文利用2008~2013年沪深A股上市公司数据,从业绩预告可能性与准确性两个层面考察了管理者能力对业绩预告的影响。实证研究表明,管理者能力越强,披露业绩预告的可能性越高,业绩预告的准确度也越高,这主要体现在预告的修正次数较少以及预告业绩与真实业绩的差距较小两个方面。研究结果表明管理者业绩预告中包含了管理者能力的信息,由于资本市场上的信息不对称导致管理者能力难以直接被投资者观察,因此能力强的管理者有动机通过准确的业绩预告向市场传达其对行业和公司的了解程度及管理能力。这有利于引导市场参与者的投资决策,提高中小投资者的投资效率。

Using data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen during 2008~2013, this paper studies the impact of managerial ability on earnings preannouncement. The empirical result shows that the possibility of management earnings preannouncement will increase with the increase of managerial ability, and the forecasts associated with higher-ability managers are more accurate. These results imply that management earnings preannouncement contains information about managerial ability. Due to the presence of information asymmetry in capital market, managerial ability can barely be observed by investors. As a result, managers have the motivation to show their understandings of industry and management abilities by providing accurate earnings preannouncement. These are of benefit to guide participants' investment decision-making, and to increase investment efficiency of small and medium investors.