战略投资者、产权性质与高管薪酬业绩敏感性

Strategic Investor, Property Right and Executive Pay–Performance Sensitivity

我国上市公司越来越多地通过引入战略投资者来完善公司治理机制。战略投资者由于持股量大、持股时间长、带有明显的战略目的等特点,相比于注重短期获利的财务投资者,更有动机监督、激励管理层,关注其薪酬契约的效率。同时,其自身丰富的管理经验、先进的管理模式以及长期的战略眼光也会对公司治理提出更高的要求。本文实证检验了战略投资者的引入对于高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。结果发现:战略投资者的引入可以提高企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性,并且,这种关系在国有企业更为显著。本文丰富了学术界关于高管薪酬契约效率影响因素的研究,并为国有企业混合所有制改革的进一步深化提供了参考,具有理论和现实意义。

Due to long holding time, large proportion of shareholding and a clear strategic objective, compared to financial investor which focuses on short-term profit, strategic investor has a stronger motivation to supervise and motivate managers to focus on the efficiency of their salary contracts. In the meanwhile, the extensive management experience, advanced management mode and long-term strategic vision will also put forward higher requirements of corporate governance. Based on these, this paper uses financial data on listed firms to examine the relationship between the introduction of strategic investor and executive pay-performance sensitivity. The results show that the introduction of strategic investor can improve the executive pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, the introduction of strategic investor can improve a greater extent of executive payperformance sensitivity in the state-owned enterprises. This paper enriches the academic research on the influencing factors of salary-contract efficiency, and provides the theoretical basis for the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, which is of theoretical and practical significance.