内部股东减持套现的信号传递

The Signal Transmission of Insiders' Selling

我国创业板市场存在这样一种现象,内部股东的股份一旦解禁,就会出现大量减持套现。本文的研究分为两部分,首先探究究竟哪类股东在巨量减持,之后分析减持行为所传递的信号效应。本文将内部股东区分为实际控制人股东和其他董监高股东进行研究,结果发现:第一,董监高持股比例越高,减持比例越高;但实际控制人相反,持股比例越高,减持越少,但不显著。这表明董监高的减持动机远大于实际控制人,市场中的多数减持来自董监高而非实际控制人。第二,董监高股东的投机性减持动机强烈,其减持发出高泡沫信号,甚至与未来营业收入增长呈反向信号关系。第三,实际控制人通过减持股份实现短期投机获利的动机较低,并且与未来业绩不显著相关。本文的研究是在已有研究基础上的深化,为有的放矢的监管提供了实证证据。

In Chinese Growth Enterprise Market, once insider shareholders' up_locked shares expires, they reduce their stock for cash. This paper studies what kind of shareholders is conducting big selling as well as the signal effect of the insiders selling their shares. We divide insider shareholders into actual controller shareholders and executives shareholders, and find that, firstly, the higher shareholding ratio of executive shareholders, the higher selling shareholding ratio and motivation they have. The actual controllers opposite result, even though it's not significant.Secondly, the executive shareholders sell their shares based on the bubble degree of the previous one year reflecting the bubble signal, and executives' selling do not have performance signal. Thirdly, the actual controllers selling shares don't rely on the evaluation bubble. Our study is beneficial to the Chinese SEC specific regulation in terms of the insider selling.