环境规制、产品市场竞争与企业研发投入

Environmental Regulation, Product Market Competition and R&D

'波特假说'认为,合理的环境规制能够促进企业的研发投入,激发'创新补偿'效应。本文以2009~2014年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,检验了环境规制和产品市场竞争对企业研发投入的影响,并进一步分析了环境规制对产品市场竞争与企业研发投入之间关系的调节效应。通过实证检验,本文认为:环境规制与企业研发投入之间存在U型关系,仅当环境规制强度跨越特定门槛值时,'波特假说'才能够实现;产品市场竞争对企业研发投入具有显著的促进作用,但是环境规制会弱化产品市场竞争对企业研发投入的正向影响,并且这种弱化作用在市场化程度较低的地区更为显著。为提高企业研发投入强度,在完善环境规制制度的同时,需要规范政府行为,减少过度干预,优化外部治理环境,发挥市场的自主性。

According to the theory of the Potter hypothesis, the reasonable environmental regulation can promote the enterprises' R&D investment, which can stimulate the effect of 'innovation compensation'. This article adopts samples of listed companies in chinese A stock market, tests the effects of environmental regulation and product market competition on enterprises' R&D investment and further analyzes the regulation effect of environmental regulation on the relation between product market competition and enterprise R&D investment. Through empirical test, we believe that the relationship between environmental regulation and enterprises' R&D investment is U type and the 'Potter hypothesis' can be realized only when the intensity of environmental regulation crosses a specific threshold. The product market competition has significant effect on corporate R&D investment, but environmental regulation will weaken the positive correlation between the product market competition and R&D investment, and the weakening effect in the low degree of marketization area is more significant. Therefore, in the long run, in order to enhance the enterprises' R&D investment intensity and improve the environmental regulation system, the government and the market should be effective to regulate the government's behavior to reduce the government's excessive intervention,optimize the external governance environment and give full play to the market allocation of resources.