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横向并购评估审查中效率抗辩研究综述

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摘要 横向并购可能给参与并购的企业带来成本节约,产生效率效应;同时,也可能提高并购企业在相关市场上的市场势力,产生反竞争效应,损害其他企业或消费者的利益。横向并购评估审查中的效率抗辩是指,并购企业只要能够证实成本节约的效率效应能够抵消反竞争效应进而增进社会总福利水平,就可以获得反垄断当局的批准。效率抗辩的主要分析框架是"威廉姆森替换",常用的福利标准主要包括消费者福利标准和社会总福利标准。效率抗辩中最为常用的效率因素分析方法是逐案分析、一般推定或序贯决策方法。
出处 《产业经济评论(山东)》 CSSCI 2013年第2期84-99,共16页 Review of Industrial Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金项目“横向并购反垄断控制中的效率抗辩研究”(11FJL013) 教育部人文社会科学项目“经营者集中的反垄断控制:理论模型、量化标准与安全港规则研究”(10YJC790351) 山东大学人文社科青年学术团队项目“反垄断行为认定中的相关市场界定研究”(IFYT12072)资助
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参考文献14

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二级参考文献38

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