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O2O模式下纵向控制、道德风险与监管设计

Vertical Integration,Moral Hazard,and Regulatory Design in O2O Mode
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摘要 O2O模式为代表的互联网产业变革,为人们生活带来舒适与便利,但同时暴露出的产品质量问题却反映出监管的不力。本文通过构造O2O平台企业纵向控制的分析框架,剖析信息不对称条件下'缔约与供求相分离'的O2O模式存在的道德风险问题,包括:信息不对称与声誉、交易成本与契约选择以及一体化结构内的机会主义。平台企业通常会运用中间品定价与进入门槛两项机制,化解服务商机会主义的行为。现实中,平台企业只会选择自身效用最大化,并设法趋近该目标,从而与社会整体福利产生偏差。 As the representative of the latest Internet industry,O2O mode which makes our life more comfortable and convenient,also has led serious quality problems as to poor supervision. Our work put forward an analysis framework of vertical integration by platform of O2O. Because of "separation of contract and delivery ",the moral hazard problems were generated in O2O mode,such as asymmetric information vs. reputation,transaction cost vs. contract,and opportunism in integration. Platform companies usually use the means of intermediate goods pricing and barriers to entry to resolve the service-providers’ opportunistic behaviors. In the reality,theplatform enterprises will only choose their own utility maximization, and try to approach the goal. Thus,they may deviate from the overall welfare of society.
出处 《产业经济评论(山东)》 CSSCI 2017年第4期56-77,共22页 Review of Industrial Economics
基金 国家社科基金一般项目“厂商纵向约束的反垄断经济学研究”(15BJY002)资助
关键词 纵向控制 道德风险 O2O模式 动态优化 激励相容 Vertical Integration Moral Hazard O2O Mode Dynamic Optimization Incentive Compatibility
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