中国产能过剩的政治经济学分析——基于财政分权和政府竞争的视角

Political Economy of China’s Capacity Surplus——Based on the Fiscal Decentralization and Governmental Competition

当前,治理中国产能过剩主要凸显为一个政治经济学问题。本文基于财政分权和政府竞争的视角,从省际整体、分行业、分地区以及分地区分行业等四个层面,较为细致地实证分析了导致中国产能过剩的主要原因及其作用特征,研究认为:总体而言,以获取财税激励为目的的财政分权和以政治晋升为特征的政府锦标赛竞争均会导致产能过剩,而且这两者在共同作用于提升产能利用率的过程中会因财政分权所包含的不同内容而展现出不同的作用特征,即政府竞争与财政收入分权会呈现出相互牵制地诱发产能过剩,而政府竞争与财政支出分权则会呈现出相互协同地促进产能利用率的特征;另外,鉴于各地区各行业具有不同的禀赋特征和发展约束,本文通过更细层面的分样本回归得出了形成中国产能过剩的更为细致的结论,也更为具体地明确了财政分权和政府竞争对于产能过剩的作用特征,这将给中国治理产能过剩提供有益的借鉴和参考。本文不仅能丰富和深化对于中国式产能过剩原因探析的学术研究,而且还能对我国如何更好地治理产能过剩提供有益的政策启示。

Governing China’s capacity surplus is a political economical problem.Based on the fiscal decentralization and governmental competition,this paper analyzes the reasons and characteristics of China’s capacity surplus from two aspects i. e.,provinces and industries. We get the conclusions as follows: totally speaking,fiscal decentralization and governmental competition will induce China’s capacity surplus,and their mutual effect will bring out different mechanism,for example the effect between fiscal income decentralization and governmental competition willinduce further capacity surplus,and the effect between fiscal expenditure decentralization and governmental competition will improve capacity utilization. Meantime,because different regions and different industries have different endowments and conditions,we use the method of separating regression and get much more conclusions and make clearer about the characteristics of China’s capacity surplus. At last,we give out some countermeasures such as enforcing fiscal decentralization’s supervising,optimizing the mechanism of government performance examination,advocating the idea of systematic government and so on.