品牌商对上游供应商生产过程环境监管的博弈模型——基于政府惩罚的视角

A Game Model for Environmental Monitoring of Brand Name on Production Processes of Suppliers——A Perspective of Government Punishment

国内外环保主义运动迫使行业品牌商注重上游供应商生产过程的环保绩效,品牌商开始对上游供应商的生产过程进行环境监管。针对品牌商对上游供应商环境监管的博弈问题,考虑消费者环保偏好、政府惩罚政策、产品质量差异等因素,构建了品牌商和普通制造商间的二阶段博弈模型。第一阶段是品牌商决定对上游供应商的环境监管水平;第二阶段是品牌商、普通制造商决定产品价格。通过数值分析,讨论了各参数变化带来的影响。最后,对政府部门、品牌商、非政府组织等提出相关的政策建议。

Domestic and international environmental movement has pressured brand name producers to put attention on the production processes environmental performance of their suppliers. The brand name has started to monitor the environmental performance of suppliers’ production processes. In order to address the gaming problems of brand name and its suppliers,this paper establishes a two-stage game model between a brand name manufacturer and a normal manufacturer,by considering the factors of consumers’ environmental preferences,government punishment policies and product quality differentiation. At the first stage, the brand name determines the monitoring level of suppliers. At the second stage,both manufacturers determines the price of their products. The following section of numerical analysis discusses the effect of various parameters changes. Finally, the policy insights into the government,brand and NGOs are provided.