期刊文献+

没有经验的打分者与信誉机制的失效——基于淘宝网数据的实证研究

The Inexperienced Graders and the Failure of the Credit System——Based on the Data from Taobao
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摘要 随着电子商务平台近年来取得的巨大成功,相对于原来平台需要帮助买家区分高信誉卖家和低信誉卖家,在高信誉卖家中,辨别哪一个更好成为更为突出的问题。而现有的信誉机制在辨别高信誉卖家中哪一个更好时会失效。当缺乏经验的买家对高信誉卖家关于商品的合理描述无法形成正确的预期时,这些买家往往容易买到与自己预期不符的商品而给卖家评出低分,这时买家买到与自己预期不符的商品责任其实应该在于买家自己而不是卖家,从而这样的评分系统会导致信誉机制失效。本文基于淘宝网的数据,通过实证检验发现,确实存在累计信用得分低的买家更容易给卖家评出低分这样的现象。这说明,现有的没有考虑买家特性的信誉机制可能是导致其在辨别高信誉卖家中哪一个更好时失效的原因,从而启发我们在设计或改进信誉机制时,要考虑买家的特性。 As the e-commerce platform achieved great success in recent years,to find which seller is better became a more outstanding issue compare with to distinguish high credit sellers and low credit sellers previously.Unfortunately,the credit system at present usually would lose effect in finding which seller is better while the two sellers were both high-credit sellers.When an inexperienced buyer bought good inconsistent with his expectation,it was the buyer’s duty if he cannot form appropriate expectation based on the appropriate description of the seller.The credit system might lose effect.Based on the data from Taobao,this paper found that there indeed exists that the buyers with low credits tend to give low grades to sellers.Such shows that the credit system without considering the feature of buyers may cause the failure for it to find the better seller between two sellers both with high-credit,which provides theoretical guidance to the design and progress of the credit system in the future.
作者 何为 李明志 Wei HE;Ming-zhi LI(School of Economics and Management of Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084)
出处 《产业组织评论》 CSSCI 2018年第1期133-148,共16页 Industrial Organization Review
基金 国家自然科学基金项目面上项目“双边市场中的信息甄别与信用评价机制”(71273151)
关键词 电子商务平台 信誉机制 缺乏经验的买家 高信誉卖家 e-commerce platform credit system inexperienced buyer high credit seller
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